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Abstract The distribution of decisional power among member states of the EU has remained
a hot issue in recent discussions about the future design of European Union decision making
and the Lisbon revision of the unsuccessful proposal of the Constitutional Treaty. Usually only
the distribution of voting weights in the Council of Ministers under the qualiﬁed majority vot-
ing rule is taken into account. In contrast, in this paper we formulate simpliﬁed models of the
consultation and co-decision procedures in the decision making of European Union institutions,
reﬂecting the fact that together with the Council of Ministers the Commission and European
Parliament are also important actors in EU decision making. The main conclusion of this paper
is that the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers voting provides incomplete
evidence about national inﬂuences in European Union decision making. With rare exceptions
decision making is based on the consultation and co-decision procedures involving the Commis-
sion and/or European Parliament. Legislative procedures change the inter-institutional distribu-
tion of power (among the Council, Commission and European Parliament) reducing the power
of the Council and at the same time they change intra-institutional power in the Council (the
relative power of the Member States compared to the Council voting without taking into account
the Commission and Parliament).
Keywords Co-decision procedure, committee system, consultation procedure, European Union
decision making, Penrose-Banzhaf power indices, qualiﬁed majority, simple voting committee,
weighted majority game
JEL classiﬁcation C71, D72, H77 ∗
1. Introduction
In discussions about the distribution of decisional power among the Member States of
the EU, only the distribution of voting weights in the Council of Ministers qualiﬁed
majority voting is taken into account. In contrast, in this paper we analyze models of
the consultation and co-decision procedures in the decision making of European Union
institutions: the Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament. While
the consultation procedure is a “game” between the Council and Commission, with an
agenda-setting role of the Commission and the consultation role of the European Par-
liament, the co-decision procedure involves all three of the most important European
institutions, providing each of them with unconditional veto rights. Table 1 illustrates
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the broad use of the consultation and co-decision procedures in legislative acts decided
by European Union institutions during 2000-2006. Consultation and co-decision are
the usual methods of European governance and the Council of Ministers is not an ex-
clusive decision maker in the EU. In this paper, using the power indices methodology,
a distribution of inﬂuence among the Commission, Council and the Parliament un-
der different decision-making procedures is being evaluated, together with the voting
power of Member States and European political parties.
Table 1. Legislative proposals under consultation and co-decision procedures 2000–2006
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CNP 150 140 118 152 121 132 126
CDP 94 84 140 117 73 88 112
Source: PreLex database (http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/rech simple.cfm?CL=en).
Note: CNP = consultation procedure, CDP = co-decision procedure.
The inter-institutional distribution of power (among the Commission, Council and
European Parliament) in the decision-making procedures of the EU (consultation pro-
cedure, and co-decision procedure) has been analyzed in Widgr´ en (1996), Laruelle and
Widgr´ en (1997) and Napel and Widgr´ en (2004). While in the ﬁrst paper (Widgr´ en,
1996) the traditional committee model is developed for the consultation procedure
(consultation procedure as a committee of n Member States plus the Commission with
a composite voting rule), other models are formulated in terms of three unitary actors’
(Commission, Council and Parliament) extensive form games, without the breakdown
of the Council into Member States and the Parliament into party factions. European
multi-cameral procedures were also studied by K¨ onig and Br¨ auninger (2001) using the
explicit analysis of winning coalitions in multi-cameral decision making, but without
the formulation ofthecorresponding voting game model. The traditionalpower indices
approach to the disaggregate modeling of the consultation and co-decision procedures,
allowing the expression of both inter-institutional and intra-institutional inﬂuence was
presented in Turnovec (2004). In this paper we extend this stream of models deﬁn-
ing national inﬂuence as the inﬂuence of Member States in the Council of Ministers’
voting and political inﬂuence as the inﬂuence of European political parties in basic
legislative procedures.
In the second section we provide a short overview of the methodology used, in-
troduce logical combinations of weighted majority games and apply the power indices
methodology for the evaluation of voting power in committee systems. We selected
the Penrose-Banzhaf concept of voting power, which is strongly recommended by
some authors and frequently used in voting power evaluation in the EU (Felsenthal
and Machover 2004a, 2004b, 2007). The third section formulates models of different
versions of the qualiﬁed majority in the Council of Ministers voting: the Nice rule
(status quo), the Lisbon Treaty rule and the proposal of “Jagiellonian compromise,”
based on the implementation of the “square root rule.” Simpliﬁed models of consulta-
tion and co-decision procedures, developed on the basis of ideas from Widgr´ en (1996)
and Turnovec (2004) are analyzed in the fourth section. The ﬁfth section provides
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empirical evidence about the structural effects of legislative procedures based on the
Penrose-Banzhaf power index (results calculated from data about the EU of 27). Con-
clusions are taken up in the sixth section.
2. Voting power in committee systems
In this part we deﬁne the logical combinations of weighted majority games and adjust
the Penrose-Banzhaf power index for the evaluation of its members’ inﬂuence.
Let n be a positive integer, w = (w1, w2, ..., wn) be a nonnegative real valued vector











By a weighted majority game of n members (Owen 1982) we mean a triple [N,q, w] in
which N = {1,2,...,n}. Number wi is called a weight of member i, q is called a quota,
any subset S⊆N is called a coalition in [N,q, w]. Coalition S is called a winning one if
åi∈Swi ≥ q and a losing one otherwise. The weighted majority game provides a model
of a simple voting committee (a single camera committee in which each member has
one weight).
Let C1 = [N1, q1, w1] and C2 = [N2, q2, w2] be a pair of weighted majority games.
Then wij, j = 1,2 denotes the weight of member i ∈ Nj in Cj, and qj is the quota
in committee Cj. Let N = N1 ∪N2. By w1 and w2 we denote the zero extension of
weight vectors w1, w2 with respect to N = N1 ∪N2 such that wij = wij if i ∈ Nj and
wij = 0 if i / ∈ Nj. Let S1 ⊆ N1 be a coalition in C1 and S2 ⊆ N2 be a coalition in C2,
then S = S1∪S2 ⊆ N is a joint coalition of the members ofC1 andC2. We assume that
the same members (if any) vote identically in both committees. The weighted majority
game Cj =[ N1 ∪N2, qj, wj ] we call a zero extension of Cj with respect to N1 ∪N2.
Considering an interrelated system of two simple voting committees with different
(possibly overlapping) sets of members in which the ﬁnal outcome of voting depends
on the results of voting in both committees, we have to substitute the corresponding
weighted majority games by their zero extensions with the same sets of members.
The union C1 ∪C2 of two games C1 = [N1, q1, w1] and C2 = [N2, q2, w2] is the
game C1 ∪C2 = [N1 ∪N2, q1 ∧q2, w1, w2 ] with the following composite voting rule:
A proposal to be passed has to obtain votes representing at least a total weight q1 in
game C1 or at least a total weight q2 in game C2. A coalition S ⊆ N = N1 ∪N2 is a
winning coalition inC1∪C2 if S1 is a winning coalition inC1 or S2 is winning coalition
inC2, The set of all winning coalitions inC1∪C2 is equal to the union of the sets of all
winning coalitions in C1 and C2.
The intersection C1 ∩C2 of two games C1 = [N1, q1, w1] and C2 = [N2, q2, w2] is
the gameC1∩C2 = [N1∪N2, q1∨q2, w1, w2] with the following composite voting rule:
A proposal to be passed has to obtain votes representing at least a total weight q1 in
game C1 and at least a total weight q2 in game C2. A coalition S ⊆ N =N1 ∪N2 is a
winning coalition inC1∪C2 if S1 is winning coalition inC1 and S2 is winning coalition
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inC2. The set of all winning coalitions inC1∩C2 is equal to the intersection of the sets
of all winning coalitions in C1 and C2.
Using union and intersection operations we can construct logical combinations of
weighted majority games. For example, [N1 ∪N2 ∪N3, (q1 ∨q2)∧q3, w1, w2, w3] is
a logical combination of three weighted majority games [N1, q1, w1], [N2, q2, w2],
[N3, q3, w3] with the following composite voting rule: A proposal to be passed has
to obtain either at least q1 weights in a simple committee [N1, q1, w1] and at least
q2 weights in a simple committee [N2, q2, w2], or at least q3 weights in a simple
committee [N3, q3, w3]. Logical combinations of weighted majority games provide
models of committee systems (committees in which each member has more weights or
multi-camera committees consisting of several simple voting committees and complex
voting rules).
Models of simple voting committees and committee systems are applicable to po-
litical science, as they provide instruments for the analysis of the a priori voting power
of their members. Voting power analysis seeks an answer to the following question:
Given a simple voting committee or a committee system, what is the inﬂuence of its
members over the outcome of voting? Voting power of a member i is a probability that
i will be decisive in the sense that such a situation appears in which she would be able
to reverse the outcome of voting by reversing her vote. To deﬁne a particular power
measure means to identify a qualitative property (decisiveness) whose presence or ab-
sence in the voting process can be established and quantiﬁed (e.g. Nurmi 1997). One
of such properties related to committee members’ positions in voting that is frequently
used as a starting point for the quantiﬁcation of voting power is the swing position of
committee members.1
Let S be a winning coalition in a weighted majority game [N, q, w]. A member k ∈
S has a swing in coalition S if åi∈Swi ≥ q and åi∈S\{k}wi < q. Assuming all coalitions
are equally likely, it makes sense to evaluate the a priori voting power of each member
of the committee by her probability to have a swing vote. This probability is measured





(where si is the number of swing votes of member i and 2n−1 is the number of coali-
tions with i as a member). To compare the relative power of different members of the







Deﬁnitions of swing votes and PB power indices can be easily extended for logical
combinations of weighted majority games.
Let [N1, q1, w1] and [N2, q2, w2] be two weighted majority games. If S ⊆N1∪N2, then
1Another property, used in the deﬁnition of an alternative Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik,
1954) is the concept of the pivot. Relations between swing votes and pivots see in Turnovec (2007). The
most comprehensive exposition of the power indices methodology is given by Felsenthal and Machover
(1998).
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a) k ∈ S has a swing vote in the committee system [N1 ∪N2, q1 ∧q2, w1, w2] =
[N1, q1, w1] ∪ [N2, q2, w2] in coalition S if and only if either åi∈Swi1 ≥ q1 and
åi∈S\{k}wi1 < q1, or åi∈Swi2 ≥ q2 and åi∈S\{k}wi2 < q2 (or both),
b) k ∈ S has a swing vote in the committee system [N1∪N2, q1∨q2, w1, w2] = [N1,
q1, w1] ∩ [N2, q2, w2] in coalition S if and only if åi∈S ¯ wi1 ≥ q1 and å
i∈S
wi2 ≥ q2,
and either åi∈S\{k}wi1 < q1, or åi∈S\{k}wi2 < q2 (or both).
Lemma 1. Let C1 and C2 be two weighted majority games (without the loss of gen-
erality we assume the same member set N in both games), i ∈ N, FPB
i (C)denotes an
absolute PB power index and fPB
i (C)denotes a relative PB power index of member i
in a game C, then for any i ∈ N
FPB
i (C1∪C2)+FPB






i (C1∩C2) = fPB
i (C1)+fPB
i (C2)
Proof. follows directly from the deﬁnition of swing votes in the union and intersection
of games C1 and C2. Member k has a swing vote in coalition S in the union of games
C1 and C2 if and only if he has a swing vote in S in game C1, or in game C2, or in
both games C1 and C2. Member k has a swing vote in coalition S in the intersection
of games C1 and C2 if and only if he has a swing vote in S in both games C1 and C2.
Let si(C1) be the number of swing votes of i in C1 and si(C2) is the number of swing
votes of i in C2, then the sum si(C1)+si(C2) contains two times the swing votes of
the intersection of games C1 and C2. Therefore, to obtain the number of swing votes
in the union of games C1 and C2 from the sum of swing votes in C1 and C2, we have
to subtract the number of swing votes in the intersection of C1 and C2. From here it
follows that si(C1 ∪C2) = si(C1)+si(C2)−si(C1 ∩C2). Applying the deﬁnition of
the PB power indices we obtain the statement of the lemma. ￿
3. Council of Ministers: A qualiﬁed majority problem
Most of the analyses of EU decision making are focused on voting in the Council. The
distribution of power in the EU Council of Ministers and European Parliament and
the development associated with the 1995, 2004 and 2007 enlargement of the EU has
been analyzed in Brams and Affuso (1985), Widgr´ en (1994, 1995), Turnovec (1996,
2001, 2002), Bindseil and Hantke (1997), Laruelle (1998), Steunenberg, Smidtchen
and Koboldt (1999), Nurmi (2000), Nurmi, Meskanen and Pajala (2001), K¨ onig and
Brauninger (2001), Leech (2002), Felsenthal and Machover (2004a, 2004b), Hosli and
Machover (2004), Plechanovov´ a (2004), Baldwin and Widgr´ en (2004), Słomczy´ nski
and ˙ Zyczkowski (2006, 2007), Hosli (2008), Leech and Azis (2008) and many others.
Also, in political discussions the problem of inﬂuence in Council voting is presented
as the crucial one, as a corner stone of national inﬂuence in EU decision making.
Let us shortly resume models of qualiﬁed majority voting in terms of the unions and
intersections of simple voting committees.
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3.1 Status quo, the Nice Treaty
Through the Nice Treaty (2000), a qualiﬁed majority in Council voting in the recent
EU is reached if the following three conditions are met:
a) A minimum of 255 votes of Member States is cast in favor of the proposal, out
of a total of 345 votes,
b) a majority of Member States approve the proposal,2
c) the votes in favor represent at least 62% of the total population of the EU.
Each Member State has a ﬁxed number of votes. The number of votes allocated
to each country is roughly determined by its population, but progressively weighted in
favor of less populated countries (see Table 2).
Let us consider three weighted majority games:
C1 = [N, q, v]
C2 = [N, r, p]
C3 = [N, c, e]
whereN isthesetofMemberStates(n=card(N)isthenumberofMemberStates),
q is the quota of votes, v is the vector of Member States votes, r is the population quota,
p is the vector of Member States shares of the population (in %), c = int(n/2)+1 is
the member states quota and e is a summation vector (one state = one vote). The
Nice qualiﬁed majority rule can be modeled as a committee system generated by the
intersection of C1, C2, and C3:
CQMN = C1∩C2∩C3 = [N, q∨r∨c, v, p, e]
In the EU-27, n = 27, q = 255, r = 62%, c = 14 (Member States’ weights and
quotas are seen in Table 2).
3.2 Controversial future, Lisbon Treaty
If the Lisbon Treaty (2007) comes into force, the qualiﬁed majority rule will be simpli-
ﬁed. In this case, for passing a proposal in the Council, a “double majority” of at least
55% of the Member States3 that represent at least 65% of the population of the Union
is required. In addition, a proposal backed by n−3 Member States is always adopted,
even if they do not represent 65% of population.
Let us consider three weighted majority games:
C1 = [N, r, p]
C2 = [N, c1, e]
C3 = [N, c2, e]
2In some cases (when the Council is not acting on a proposal of the Commission) a two-thirds majority is
required.
3When the Council is not acting on a proposal of the Commission, a majority of 72% of Member States is
required.
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Germany 29 8.41 82.10 16.71 9.06 9.45 1 3.70
France 29 8.41 61.40 12.49 7.84 8.17 1 3.70
UK 29 8.41 60.50 12.31 7.78 8.11 1 3.70
Italy 29 8.41 58.00 11.80 7.62 7.95 1 3.70
Spain 27 7.83 44.70 9.10 6.69 6.98 1 3.70
Poland 27 7.83 38.10 7.75 6.17 6.44 1 3.70
Romania 14 4.06 21.70 4.42 4.66 4.86 1 3.70
Netherlands 13 3.77 16.50 3.36 4.06 4.24 1 3.70
Greece 12 3.48 11.10 2.26 3.33 3.48 1 3.70
Portugal 12 3.48 10.60 2.16 3.26 3.40 1 3.70
Belgium 12 3.48 10.40 2.12 3.22 3.36 1 3.70
Czech R. 12 3.48 10.30 2.10 3.21 3.35 1 3.70
Hungary 12 3.48 10.00 2.04 3.16 3.30 1 3.70
Sweden 10 2.90 9.10 1.85 3.02 3.15 1 3.70
Austria 10 2.90 8.30 1.69 2.88 3.01 1 3.70
Bulgaria 10 2.90 7.70 1.57 2.77 2.89 1 3.70
Slovakia 7 2.03 5.40 1.10 2.32 2.42 1 3.70
Denmark 7 2.03 5.40 1.10 2.32 2.42 1 3.70
Finland 7 2.03 5.20 1.06 2.28 2.38 1 3.70
Island 7 2.03 4.20 0.85 2.05 2.14 1 3.70
Lithuania 7 2.03 3.40 0.69 1.84 1.92 1 3.70
Latvia 4 1.16 2.30 0.47 1.52 1.58 1 3.70
Slovenia 4 1.16 2.00 0.41 1.41 1.48 1 3.70
Estonia 4 1.16 1.30 0.26 1.14 1.19 1 3.70
Cyprus 4 1.16 0.80 0.16 0.89 0.93 1 3.70
Luxembourg 4 1.16 0.50 0.10 0.71 0.74 1 3.70










Total 345 100 491.40 100 95.85 100 27 100 785 100.00
quota Nice 255 73.91% 304.67 62% 14 50.01% 393 50.01
quota Lisbon 319.41 65% 15 55% 393 50.01
quota SR 58.85 61.40 393 50.01
Source: http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index en.htm.
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where N is the set of Member States (n = card(N) is the number of Member States), r
is the population quota, p is the vector of Member States’ shares of population (in %),
c1 = int(55n/100)+1 is the Member States’ quota, c2 = n−3 is alternative Member
States’ quota and e is a summation vector (one state = one vote). The Lisbon-qualiﬁed
majority rule can be modeled as a committee system generated by the intersection of
C1and C2, and the union of (C1∩C2) and C3:
CQML = (C1∩C2)∪C3 = [N, (r∨c1)∧c2, p, e, e], c2 > c1
In the EU-27, r = 65%, c1 = 15, c2 = 24 (for Member States’ weights and quotas see
Table 2).
3.3 Fairness and square-ness story
In the late spring of 2004 an open letter from European scientists to the governments of
EUMemberStateswasdistributedthroughouttheEuropeanacademiccommunity. The
open letter was originally signed by a group of nine distinguished scientists from six
EU countries, calling themselves “Scientists for a democratic Europe,” and was later
cosigned by 38 colleagues, and then was submitted to the governments of Member
States and to the Commission.4
The basic idea of the proposal supported by the open letter is the following concept
of “fairness”: If the European Union is a union of citizens, then it is fair when each
citizen (independently of her national afﬁliation) exercises the same inﬂuence over
Union issues. It is achieved when the voting weight of each national representation in
the Council of Ministers is proportional to the square root of the population.
The so-called square root rule is attributed to the British statistician Lionel Penrose
(1946) and is closely related to the indirect voting power measured by the Penrose-
Banzhaf power index. Different aspects of the square root rule are analyzed in Felsen-
thal and Machover (1998, 2007), Laruelle and Widgr´ en (1998), Baldwin and Widgr´ en
(2004), Słomczy´ nski and ˙ Zyczkowski (2006, 2007) and Leech and Aziz (2008).
The concept of indirect voting power is based on the following rather artiﬁcial
construction: Assume n units (e.g. regions) with different sizes of population (voters),
represented in a super-regional committee that decides different agendas relevant for
the whole entity. Each unit representation in the committee has some voting weight
(number of votes). The decision-making process is performed by a series of referenda
in each unit and units’ representations in the committee are voting according to the
results of referenda. In each unit an individual citizen has the same voting weight (one
vote) that provides her with a voting power (each citizen from one unit has the same
voting power). Also, each super-regional representation has some voting power in the
committee that follows from its voting weight in the committee. Then, the indirect
voting power of a citizen from a particular unit is given by the product of her voting
power in local referenda and the voting power of her representation in the committee.
4The letter (including added tables) and list of its signatories can be seen at the following Web site:
http://www.esi2.us.es/∼mbilbao/pdfﬁles/letter.pdf
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The representation of units in the committee is considered fair if each citizen has the
same indirect voting power independently of the unit she belongs to.
Let us have n countries, i = 1,2,..., n with the population p1, p2, ..., pn. Con-
sider a randomly selected “yes/no” issue and suppose that member nations decide their
approval or rejection by referendum. For simplicity assume the number of voters par-
ticipating in the referendum is equal to the number of the population, and the quota
(number of votes required to approve the proposal) is equal to mi < pi. We can assume











(the least integer greater than
pi
2 ). Then the number of cases in which the average
citizen of country i will have a swing vote (the outcome of the national referendum




































(the power of a citizen of country i, the absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index). From
the Pi(pi) formula it follows that the smaller the population, the higher the Penrose-













(for proof see Laruelle and Widgr´ en, 1998). The larger size of the population in the
country i, the smaller is the individual citizen’s Penrose-Banzhaf power in referendum-
type country voting. If the countries’ representations in the Council of Ministers that
are voting on each issue according to the results of a national referenda and Fi is the





isthei-thcountry-average citizen(indirect)power intheCouncil ofMinisters’decision
making. To guarantee the equal indirect power of citizens of different countries in the










to the square root of the population.
There is still one problem to be solved: What allocation of voting weights among
Member States leads to the proportionality of power to the square root of the popula-
tion? Supporters of the square root rule are proposing to allocate the weights in the
Council proportionally to the square of the population, assuming that in committees
with a large number of members the distribution of weights is a good proxy of vot-
ing power. However, a priori voting power seldom reﬂects the distribution of voting
weights. If [N, q, w] is a simple weighted committee and F [N, q, w] is a vector of the
power indices of its members, then usually F [N, q, w] 6= aw.
Being aware of this problem, Słomczy´ nski and ˙ Zyczkowski (2006) formulated the
following minimization problem:
Minimize the sum of square residuals between the normalized Penrose-Banzhaf
power indices and voting weights deﬁned as proportional to the square roots of the

















for q ∈ (0.5,1]. They used simulation and found the approximation of the optimal
quota q ≈ 61.4% for the EU of 27. So, the ﬁnal proposal, known as “Jagiellonian
Compromise,” reads as follows: “The voting weight of each Member State is allocated
proportionally to the square of its population, the decision of the Council being taken
if the sum of weights exceeds a (certain) quota” (Słomczy´ nski and ˙ Zyczkowski, 2006),
setting the quota equal to 61.4% of the sum of the square roots of the population in the
Member States of the EU.
Inournotationsthesquarerootqualiﬁedmajoritycanbeformalizedastheweighted
majority game:
CQMS = [N, r,
√
p],
where N is the set of Member States, r is a population square root quota and
√
p is the
vector of the Member States’ square roots of their populations (in %). In the EU-27,
r = 61.4 and the square root of the population can be seen in Table 2.
4. The Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament: Consulta-
tion and co-decision procedures
Let
N be the set of Members States, i = 1,2,...,n,
N ∪{1} be the set of actors in the consultation procedure (Member States plus
the Commission),
M be the set of factions in the European Parliament (European political parties),
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vi be the number of votes assigned to Member State i,
sj be the number of seats of European political party j,
v be the vector of Member States votes in the Council (vote weights, as deﬁned
in Nice),
p be the vector of shares of Member States’ populations,
√
p be the vector of the square roots of population shares,
e be the summation vector (one state – one vote weights),
s be the vector of the “weights” (numbers of seats) of political parties in the
European Parliament,
q be the votes quota in the Council (the minimal number of votes required to
pass a proposal),
c be the Member States quota in the Council (the minimal number of Member
States required to pass a proposal),
r be a population quota in the Council (the countries supporting the proposal
must represent at least r% of the total population of the Member States support-
ing the proposal),
t be a quota in the European Parliament (the minimal number of the members of
the EP required to pass a proposal).
If x ∈ Rn, then
x(−k) ∈ Rn+k denotes the left zero extension of x (ﬁrst k components equal 0),
x(+k) ∈ Rn+k denotes the right zero extension of x (last k components equal 0),
e(n,j) ∈ Rn denotes the n-dimensional unit vector with a j-th component equal to
1, all other components equal 0.
4.1 Consultation procedure
We assume that voting in the Commission is not inﬂuenced by the citizenship of Com-
missioners and by their ideological preferences;the Commission is making decisions
as a collective body and the results of its voting are not known.
The European Commission sends its proposals to both the Council of Ministers
and European Parliament, but it is the Council that ofﬁcially consults Parliament and
other bodies. However, the Council is not bound by the Parliament’s position, so the
Parliament cannot change the proposal or prevent its adoption. Then the Council either
approves the proposal by a qualiﬁed majority or rejects it by a blocking minority, or
amends it by unanimity. Depending on the version of the qualiﬁed majority in the
Council we have three models of the consultation procedure.
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a) The Nice version of the consultation procedure. From the committee system for
a qualiﬁed majorityCQMN = [N, q∨r∨c, v, p, e] we obtain the following model
of the consultation procedure:
CCNPN = [N∪{1}, ((q∨r∨c)∨1)∧n, v(+1), p(+1), e(+1), e(n+1,n+1), e(+1)]
The proposal is accepted if it is supported by the Commission and approved by
a Nice-qualiﬁed majority in the Council (no less than q = 255 votes, at least
r = 62% of the population and at least c = 14 Member States), or changed if it
has the unanimous support of all n Member States in the Council, even if the
change is not supported by the Commission.
b) The Lisbon version of the consultation procedure:
CCNPL = [N∪{1}, ((r∨c1)∧c2)∨1)∧n, p(+1), e(+1), e(+1), e(n+1,n+1), e(+1)]
The proposal is accepted if it is supported by the Commission and approved by
a Lisbon qualiﬁed majority in the Council (at least r = 65% of the population
and at least c1 = 55% of Member States, or at least c2 = 24 Member States even
without a population quota, or changed if it has unanimous support, even if the
change is not supported by the Commission).
c) The square root version of the consultation procedure:
CCNPS = [N∪{1}, (r∨1)∧n,
p
p(+1), e(n+1,n+1), e(+1)]
The proposal is accepted if it is supported by the Commission and approved by
a square root qualiﬁed majority in the Council (at least r = 61.4% of square root
population weights), or changed if it has unanimous support, even if the change




A new legislative proposal is drafted by the Commission and is submitted to the
Council and the Parliament. During the ﬁrst reading the Council adopts the “common
position,” by a qualiﬁed majority including its amendments, and the EP approves it by
a simple majority including its amendments. If the two institutions have agreed on the
same amendments after the ﬁrst reading the proposal becomes law. Otherwise there is
a second reading in each institution where each considers the others’ amendments. If
the institutions are unable to reach agreement after the second reading, a conciliation
committee is set up with an equal number of members of the Parliament and the Coun-
cil. The committee attempts to negotiate a compromise text that must be approved by
both institutions. Both the Parliament and Council have the power to reject a proposal
either in its second reading or following conciliation, causing the proposal to fail. The
Commission may also withdraw its proposal at any time.
The European Parliament of the EU of 27 has 785 members in 8 political groups
(European political parties): European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED),
Group of the Party of European Socialists (PES), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
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for Europe (ALDE), Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), European Greens – Eu-
ropean Free Alliance (Greens-EFA), European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE-
NGL), Independence and Democracy (IND-DEM), Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty
(ITS), Non Attached (NI). The distribution of seats among political groups can be
seen in Table 1, the national representation in the EP is roughly proportional to the
population. The voting quota in the EP is 393 votes (simple majority).
WeassumethattheEuropeanParliamentrepresentstheinterestsofcitizensandacts
on the basis of ideological principles expressed by European political parties, hence
voting in the Parliament does not necessarily correlate to voting in the Council.
a) Nice version of the co-decision procedure. From the committee system for a
qualiﬁed majority CQMN = [N, q∨r∨c, v, p, e] we obtain the following model
of the co-decision procedure:
CCDPN = [N∪{1}∪M, ((q∨r∨c)∨1)∨t, v(m+1), p(m+1), e(m+1), e(n+m+1,n+1),
s(−n−1)]
The proposal is accepted if it is supported by the Commission, approved by a
Nice-qualiﬁed majority in the Council (at least q=255 votes, at least r =62% of
the population and at least c = 14 Member States), and by the required majority
in the European Parliament (t = 393).
b) Lisbon version of the co-decision procedure:
CCDPL =[N∪{1}∪M, ((r∨c1)∧c2)∨1)∨t, p(m+1), e(m+1), e(m+1), e(n+m+1,n+1),
s(−n−1)]
The proposal is accepted if it is supported by the Commission and approved by
a Lisbon-qualiﬁed majority in the Council (at least r = 65% of population and at
leastc1 =55%ofMemberStates, oratleastc2 =24MemberStatesevenwithout
the population quota), and by the required majority in the European Parliament
(t = 393).
c) The square root version of the co-decision procedure:
CCDPS = [N∪{1}∪M, (r∨1)∨t,
p
p(m+1), e(n+m+1,n+1), s(−n−1)]
The proposal is accepted if it is supported by the Commission and approved by
a square root qualiﬁed majority in the Council (at least r = 61.4% of square root
population weights), and by the required majority in the European Parliament
(t = 393).
5. Empirical ﬁndings
In Table 3 we provide the Penrose-Banzhaf power indices (in relative form) calcu-
lated for three different procedures (qualiﬁed majority, consultation procedure and co-
decision procedure) in three alternative settings (Nice, Lisbon, square root). We apply
the Lemma from Section 1 to nine corresponding committee systems.
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Table 3. Inter-institutional and intra-institutional relative power in EU-27 legislative procedures
(Penrose-Banzhaf index)
Qualiﬁed majority Consultation procedure Co-decision procedure
Nice Lisbon SR Nice Lisbon SR Nice Lisbon SR
Germany 7.78 11.67 9.47 7.02 10.15 8.21 6.08 7.66 6.49
France 7.78 8.87 8.18 7.02 7.71 7.09 6.08 5.72 5.6
UK 7.78 8.75 8.12 7.02 7.61 7.03 6.08 5.65 5.55
Italy 7.78 8.43 7.95 7.02 7.33 6.89 6.08 5.46 5.44
Spain 7.42 6.69 6.97 6.7 5.82 6.04 5.8 4.39 4.76
Poland 7.42 5.71 6.44 6.7 4.97 5.58 5.8 4.01 4.38
Romania 4.26 4.19 4.86 3.86 3.65 4.21 3.34 2.78 3.3
Netherlands 3.97 3.53 4.23 3.61 3.07 3.67 3.12 2.42 2.87
Greece 3.68 2.87 3.54 3.34 2.5 3.07 2.89 2.05 2.35
Portugal 3.68 2.81 3.4 3.34 2.54 2.94 2.89 2.01 2.3
Belgium 3.68 2.79 3.35 3.34 2.43 2.91 2.89 2 2.27
Czech R. 3.68 2.78 3.34 3.34 2.42 2.9 2.89 1.99 2.26
Hungary 3.68 2.74 3.29 3.34 2.38 2.85 2.89 1.97 2.23
Sweden 3.09 2.63 3.15 2.81 2.29 2.73 2.43 1.9 2.13
Austria 3.09 2.53 3 2.81 2.21 2.6 2.43 1.85 2.03
Bulgaria 3.09 2.46 2.88 2.81 2.14 2.5 2.43 1.81 1.95
Slovakia 2.18 2.18 2.42 1.98 1.9 2.09 1.71 1.64 1.63
Denmark 2.18 2.18 2.42 1.98 1.9 2.09 1.71 1.64 1.63
Finland 2.18 2.16 2.37 1.98 1.88 2.06 1.71 1.63 1.61
Ireland 2.18 2.04 2.13 1.98 1.77 1.85 1.71 1.56 1.44
Lithuania 2.18 1.94 1.92 1.98 1.69 1.66 1.71 1.5 1.3
Latvia 1.26 1.81 1.58 1.98 1.57 1.37 1.71 1.42 1.07
Slovenia 1.26 1.77 1.47 1.13 1.54 1.27 0.98 1.4 0.99
Estonia 1.26 1.69 1.19 1.13 1.46 1.03 0.98 1.35 0.8
Cyprus 1.26 1.63 0.93 1.13 1.41 0.8 0.98 1.32 0.63
Luxembourg 1.26 1.58 0.74 1.13 1.38 0.64 0.98 1.29 0.5
Malta 0.94 1.57 0.66 0.86 1.27 0.57 0.74 1.29 0.44
EPP-ED 4.87 6.74 7.13
PES 2.63 4.05 4.27
ALDE 2.5 3.38 3.56
UEN 0.75 1.35 1.43
Greens-EFA 0.75 1.35 1.43
GUE-NGL 0.75 1.35 1.43
IND-DEM 0.41 0.43 0.47
ITS 0.41 0.43 0.47
NI 0.41 0.43 0.47
Council 100 100 100 91.34 86.99 86.65 79.04 69.71 67.95
Commission 8.66 13.01 13.35 7.48 10.78 11.39
Parliament 13.48 19.51 20.66
Council + Commission 100 100 100
Council + Commission + Parliament 100 100 100
Source: Author’s own calculations
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The results demonstrate changes in the inter-institutional inﬂuence of the three
most important EU institutions – the Council, Commission and Parliament. In the case
of the consultation procedure, the Lisbon-qualiﬁed majority rule increases the power of
the Commission compared to the Nice rule, and the square root rule increases its power
compared to Lisbon (and the power of the Council as an aggregate power of Member
States declines). In the co-decision procedure, where we have three institutional ac-
tors – the Council, Commission and Parliament – we can observe the same tendency:
Lisbon increases power of the Commission and Parliament and decreases the power
of the Council compared to the Nice rule and the square root increases the power of
the Commission and Parliament and decreases the power of the Council compared to
Lisbon. Moreover, in the co-decision procedure the inﬂuence of big European politi-
cal parties can be compared to the inﬂuence of big Member States, so the political or
ideological dimension of European Union decision making becomes measurably more
important than in earlier stages of EU development. The inﬂuence of Member States
is procedurally dependent and differs from their internal inﬂuence in the Council of
Ministers internal voting not only by size, but also by structure.
In Table 4 we provide a structural comparison of the distribution of power in the
Council in internal Council qualiﬁed majority voting, consultation procedure voting
and co-decision procedure voting. The entries of Table 3 express the share of voting
power of each Member State in the total inter-institutional power of the considered
procedures (e.g. if the relative power of Germany in the co-decision procedure under
Lisbon voting rules is 7.66% and the relative power of the Council in the co-decision
procedureis69.71%, thentheshareoftherelativepowerofGermanyintheco-decision
relative power of the Council is 10.99%).
The relative intra-institutional power of Member States in the Council of Ministers
in different legislative procedures is deﬁned as a ratio of the number of swing votes
the Member State has in a given procedure to the total number of swing votes of all
Member States in the procedure. In block Nice we provide the relative power of in-
dividual Member States in Council voting under the recent voting rules of the Treaty
of Nice: QM stands only for qualiﬁed majority voting in the Council (without interac-
tion with other institutions), CNP stands for qualiﬁed majority Council voting in the
consultation procedure, and CDP stands for qualiﬁed majority Council voting in the
co-decision procedure. The same information for Lisbon voting rules can be found in
block Lisbon and in block Square root for square root rule.
We can see that legislative procedures inﬂuence the structure of Member States’
relative power in Council voting. Under Nice rules the consultation and co-decision
procedures have a negligible effect on the internal distribution of national power with
only one exception (the signiﬁcant increase of Latvia’s relative power). In the Lisbon
case we can observe the negligible effect of the consultation procedure, but the quite
signiﬁcant impact of the co-decision procedure, generating a decrease of the relative
power of the ﬁve biggest Member States, a slight increase of Poland’s power , a de-
crease of Romania and the Netherlands’ relative power and increases of the relative
power of all other medium-sized and small countries. The square root rule leads to an
increase of the relative power of the ﬁve biggest states, does not change the relative
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power of Romania, and decreases or leaves unchanged the relative power of medium-
sized and small member states.
Table 4. Relative power of member states in EU-27 legislative procedures
(Penrose-Banzhaf index)
Nice Lisbon Square root
QM CNP CDP QM CNP CDP QM CNP CDP
Germany 7.78 7.68 7.69 11.67 11.67 10.99 9.47 9.47 9.55
France 7.78 7.68 7.69 8.87 8.86 8.21 8.18 8.18 8.24
UK 7.78 7.68 7.69 8.75 8.75 8.11 8.12 8.11 8.17
Italy 7.78 7.68 7.69 8.43 8.43 7.83 7.95 7.95 8.01
Spain 7.42 7.33 7.34 6.69 6.69 6.3 6.97 6.97 7.01
Poland 7.42 7.33 7.34 5.71 5.71 5.75 6.44 6.44 6.45
Romania 4.26 4.23 4.23 4.19 4.2 3.98 4.86 4.86 4.86
Netherlands 3.97 3.93 3.95 3.53 3.53 3.47 4.23 4.24 4.22
Greece 3.68 3.66 3.66 2.87 2.87 2.94 3.54 3.54 3.46
Portugal 3.68 3.66 3.66 2.81 2.92 2.88 3.4 3.39 3.38
Belgium 3.68 3.66 3.66 2.79 2.79 2.87 3.35 3.36 3.34
Czech R. 3.68 3.66 3.66 2.78 2.78 2.85 3.34 3.35 3.33
Hungary 3.68 3.66 3.66 2.74 2.74 2.83 3.29 3.29 3.28
Sweden 3.09 3.08 3.07 2.63 2.63 2.73 3.15 3.15 3.13
Austria 3.09 3.08 3.07 2.53 2.54 2.65 3 3 2.99
Bulgaria 3.09 3.08 3.07 2.46 2.46 2.6 2.88 2.89 2.87
Slovakia 2.18 2.17 2.16 2.18 2.18 2.35 2.42 2.41 2.39
Denmark 2.18 2.17 2.16 2.18 2.18 2.35 2.42 2.41 2.39
Finland 2.18 2.17 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.34 2.37 2.38 2.37
Ireland 2.18 2.17 2.16 2.04 2.03 2.24 2.13 2.14 2.12
Lithuania 2.18 2.17 2.16 1.94 1.94 2.15 1.92 1.92 1.91
Latvia 1.26 2.17 2.16 1.81 1.8 2.04 1.58 1.58 1.57
Slovenia 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.77 1.77 2.01 1.47 1.47 1.46
Estonia 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.69 1.68 1.94 1.19 1.19 1.18
Cyprus 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.63 1.62 1.89 0.93 0.92 0.93
Luxembourg 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.58 1.6 1.85 0.74 0.74 0.74
Malta 0.94 0.94 0.95 1.57 1.47 1.85 0.66 0.65 0.65
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Author’s own calculations
6. Conclusions
The author is aware of the fact that the models of consultation and co-decision pro-
cedures that have been utilized are highly simpliﬁed (i.e. the assumption of the equal
probability of all possible coalitions, they do not reﬂect the multi-stage character of the
games and the complex amendment process). However, under the hypothesis that the
models reﬂect the basic features of the legislative procedures, they lead to interesting
conclusions.
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The inﬂuence of Member States in European Union decision making cannot be
reduced to relative voting power in qualiﬁed majority voting in the Council indepen-
dently of legislative procedures used involving the Commission and European Parlia-
ment. The consultation procedure (with the explicit interaction of the Commission and
Council, wheretheCommissionhasagenda-settingauthority), andtheco-decisionpro-
cedure involving the Commission, Council and European Parliament (with the de facto
unconditional veto right of all three institutions) affects the distribution of the inter-
institutional voting power of EU institutions and the intra-institutional voting power
of decision-making actors (Member States and European political parties). With rare
exceptions, decision making is based on the consultation and co-decision procedures
involving the Commission and/or European Parliament.
Qualiﬁed majority, consultation and co-decision procedures can be modeled as the
logical combinations of weighted majority games and the power indices methodology
can be used. If one wants to measure national inﬂuence on the basis of its inﬂuence in
the Council, then inter-institutional inﬂuence has to be taken into account. In consul-
tation procedures the Council shares the power with the Commission. In co-decision
procedures the Council shares the power with the Commission and the Parliament.
Consultation procedures reduce the power of the Council in favor of the Commission,
and co-decision procedures reduce the power of the Council and Commission in fa-
vor of the European Parliament. In both procedures this implies not only a reduction
of the power of Member States in the Council, but also changes the structure of their
power in the Council. On the other hand, in co-decision procedures, European politi-
cal parties become important actors in EU decision making. To evaluate the different
proposals of qualiﬁed majority rules from the standpoint of “fairness” of a Member
States’ share of power, one has to consider their effects on Member States’ power in
the legislative procedures. National inﬂuence in EU decision making should be mea-
sured as the weighted average of power in legislative procedures with weights given
by the frequency of use of these procedures.
The power indices methodology has its critics. What exactly power indices are
measuring is controversial, see e.g. the arguments of Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) about
ignoring preferences, and the response of Holler and Widgr´ en (1999), but they are of
general interest to political science because they can measure players’ abilities to get
what they want. Admittedly, a signiﬁcant shareofdecisions under EU decision-making
procedures are adopted without recourse to a formal vote. But it may well be the case
that the outcome of a negotiation is conditioned by the possibility that a vote could
be taken, and that an a priori evaluation of voting power does indeed matter. More-
over, analyses of the institutional design of decision making could beneﬁt from the
power indices methodology (Holler and Owen, 2001; Lane and Berg, 1999). Conti-
nued research and a deepening understanding of the power indices methodology reﬂect
an actual demand for the amendment of the traditional legal and political analysis of
institutional problems by quantitative approaches and arguments.
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